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 ABSTRACT 
The primary inquiry of this study is to identify and understand the underlying 
factors that enable smallholder farmer groups to improve their market situation. 
The specific objective of this paper is to examine to what extent certain group 
characteristics and asset endowments facilitate collective action initiatives to 
improve group marketing performance. This objective is approached through an 
evaluation of a government-led program in Tanzania, which is attempting to 
increase smallholder farmers’ incomes and food security through a market-oriented 
intervention. Findings suggest that more mature groups with strong internal 
institutions, functioning group activities, and a good asset base of natural capital 
are more likely to improve their market situation. Gender composition of groups 
also factors in group marketing performance. It acts as an enabling factor for male-
dominated groups and as a disabling factor for female-only groups. Structural social 
capital in the form of membership in other groups and ties to external service 
providers, and cognitive social capital in the form of intragroup trust and altruistic 
behavior are not significant factors in a group’s ability to improve its market 
situation. 
Keywords: Collective Action, Agricultural Marketing, Farmer Groups, Social 
Capital, Planned Change Initiatives, Tanzania 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the importance of smallholder agriculture has been greatly 
recognized, demonstrated by both the donor community and governments’ pledge 
to engage in the requisite interventions to generate agricultural and economic 
growth. In poststructural adjustment Africa, this growing recognition has led to two 
major crosscurrents of theory and practice that now define the major policy 
directives concerned with boosting Africa’s faltering agricultural economies. First, 
agricultural development will not occur without engaging smallholder farmers. 
Accounting for the overwhelming majority of actors in this sector, smallholder 
farmers must be made central to any strategy to revitalize not only the agricultural 
sector, but also the economy as a whole (Magingxa and Kamara 2003; Diao and 
Hazell 2004; Resnick 2004). The second current, which intersects the first, is that 
the major obstacle facing smallholder-led agricultural growth is lack of market 
access. Thus, the major proponents of market-led growth contend that enhancing 
market access for smallholders will lead to increased incomes and food security, 
more opportunities for rural employment, and sustained agricultural growth 
(Dorward et al. 2003; Stiglitz 2002; Poulton et al. 1998).  
Market access proponents make a strong and attractive case that for small 
farmers to thrive in the global economy, it is necessary to create an entrepreneurial 
culture in rural communities where “farmers produce for markets rather than trying 
to market what they produce” (Lundy, Ostertag, and Best 2002, 19). From an 
implementation perspective, this means shifting the focus from production-related 
programs to more market-oriented interventions. This has placed renewed attention 
on institutions of collective action—most often realized through the structure of 
farmer groups—as an important and efficient mechanism for enhancing the 
marketing performance of smallholder farmers (Kariuki and Place 2005). 
This study takes place within the context of these two crosscurrents of theory 
and practice. The primary inquiry of this study is to identify and understand the 
underlying factors that enable smallholder producer groups to improve their market 
situation. The specific objective of this paper is to examine to what extent certain 
group characteristics and asset endowments facilitate collective action initiatives to 
improve group marketing performance. This objective is approached through an 
evaluation of a government-led program in Tanzania, which is attempting to 
increase smallholder farmers’ incomes and food security through a market-oriented 
intervention. Through the lens of a livelihoods approach, this program is attempting 
to improve the marketing performance of smallholder farmers by enhancing their 
stocks of human and social capital. This is being done by establishing new groups, 
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  1 strengthening existing groups, providing skills training in marketing and 
entrepreneurship, and by linking these groups to other chain actors to improve 
market relations and forge new business partnerships. 
2.  COLLECTIVE ACTION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The literature on collective action in theory and practice emerged from 
dissatisfaction and failures of many of the rural development programs of the 1960s 
and 1970s. The development paradigms of this period assumed that communities 
would willfully engage in collective activities, with little time and scrutiny given to 
understand under what condition will this happen or on how these actions might be 
sustained (Meinzen-Dick, Di Gregorio, and McCarthy 2004). Beginning with the 
work of Olson (1965) and followed by the works of Axelrod (1984), Uphoff (1986), 
and Ostrom (1990), a body of theory soon developed attempting to explain the 
enabling conditions for successful collective action outcomes. 
Some of the greatest gains empirically and theoretically on the subject of 
collective action have been found in the field of natural resource management 
(NRM). Of particular importance have been the works of Wade (1988), Ostrom 
(1990, 1992) and Baland and Platteau (1996). Agrawal (2001) synthesized these 
works in an effort to identify a common list of enabling conditions for successful 
collective action outcomes. These conditions include (1) small group size; (2) 
clearly defined boundaries; (3) shared norms; (4) past successful experiences; (5) 
appropriate leadership; (6) interdependence among group members; (7) 
heterogeneity of endowments, homogeneity of identities and interests; and (8) low 
levels of poverty. 
A review of collective action theory parallels the social capital literature. 
Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) highlight how structural forms of social capital (that 
is, roles, rules, procedures, social networks) facilitate mutually beneficial collective 
action and how cognitive forms of social capital (that is, norms, values, attitudes, 
and trust) are conducive for mutually beneficial collective action. The authors show 
how these forms of social capital brought about successful collective action 
measures in management of irrigation schemes. Other studies, such as Pretty and 
Ward (2001) and Krishna (2001), have similarly shown how human and social 
capital formation—often represented in community-based groups—have been 
pivotal in solving many of the communities’ development problems, particularly in 
the areas of natural resource management. 
While there is substantial evidence behind the importance of social capital to 
maintain and improve natural capital, far fewer studies examine how social capital 
is utilized for the purposes of collective action to improve the marketing 
performance of groups. This is particularly apparent when examining the extent 
that group characteristics may influence or determine certain marketing outcomes. 
The studies that do emerge are often looking at higher tier organizations, such as 
cooperatives or agribusiness enterprises. For example, Jones (2004) shows how 
interpersonal trust and wealth heterogeneity among cooperative members were 
enabling conditions for the success of the cooperative, especially during the first 
stages of cooperative formation. Johnson, Suarez, and Lundy (2002) show how 
social capital, as expressed through business firm relationships, contributed 
positively to firm productivity and performance. With little attention in the literature 
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marketing performance of lower tier organizations such as producer groups, this 
paper contributes to this field of inquiry by testing a number of hypotheses.  
Study Hypotheses 
A total of eight hypotheses were derived from collective action and social capital 
literature to be tested to determine the extent that certain group assets and 
characteristics may affect a group’s ability to improve its market situation. The 
following three hypotheses were derived from the social capital literature: 
Hypothesis 1. Farmer groups with a high level of trust among members will 
be better positioned to improve their marketing performance. 
Hypothesis 2. Farmer groups that exude more altruistic rather than self-
interested behavior among members will be better positioned to improve their 
marketing performance. 
Hypothesis 3. Farmer groups with more ties to other organizations in and 
outside of their community will be better positioned to improve their marketing 
performance. 
The first two hypotheses deal with cognitive social capital and its effect on 
group marketing performance. The third hypothesis is concerned with testing the 
effects of structural social capital on group marketing performance. According to 
the literature, cognitive social capital should enable group to maximize their 
existing resources, whereas structural social capital should enable groups to access 
new resources (for example, information, innovations and technologies, service 
provision, credit, and so on.).  
The next five hypotheses were derived from the collective action literature, 
based on the notion that farmer groups will be better positioned to improve their 
marketing performance if the group has some or all of the following attributes 
(noting that poverty is broadly defined to include varying levels of livelihood asset 
configurations—that is, natural, physical, financial, human, and social capital— 
accessible to groups to carry out collective action initiatives: 
Hypothesis 4. Lower levels of poverty 
Hypothesis 5. Smaller group size 
Hypothesis 6. Past successful experiences 
Hypothesis 7. Heterogeneity of endowments 
Hypothesis 8. Homogeneity of identities and interests  
  3 3.  BACKGROUND ON PROGRAM AND STUDY AREA 
This study is approached through a “planned change initiative” called the 
Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Program (AMSDP). The program is 
being financed primarily through the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). The target 
beneficiaries are poor smallholder farmers, and the overarching goal is to increase 
their incomes and food security through improvements in market access. Within 
AMSDP, improving market access includes the following components: (1) reforming 
the regulatory and taxation system; (2) improving market infrastructure (for 
example, building more roads, postharvest facilities, and market centers); (3) 
establishing agricultural marketing information systems; and (4) strengthening 
producer groups and creating market linkages. The primary focus of this study has 
been the fourth component of the program.  
This particular component was to be accomplished through a joint 
partnership between the district governments and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). The main tasks of the NGOs—or partner agencies (PAs) as they are 
referred to in the program—are to train existing or newly formed producer groups 
in a number of capacity-building and marketing skills measures and where possible, 
to establish sustainable market linkages with other chain actors. AMSDP began in 
January 2004 with eight PAs implementing the program with producer groups in 
eight regions located in the northern and southern parts of Tanzania. The research 
site for this study is located in the northern highlands region of Tanzania. The study 
research partners were two local organizations participating in the role of PAs in the 
Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions: the Traditional Irrigation and Environmental 
Development Organization (TIP) and Faida Market Link Company Limited (FAIDA). 
TIP worked with producer groups in the district of Arumeru, and FAIDA worked with 
groups in the district of Hai. Although located in two different regions, the two 
districts actually border each other. Arumeru district surrounds the slopes of Mt. 
Meru—Africa’s fifth highest mountain—and Hai district is situated on the plains and 
lower slopes between Mt. Meru and Mt. Kilimanjaro—Africa’s highest mountain 
(Figure 1).  
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Source: Adapted from IFAD (2001, 3). 
Agroecology and Demographics of Study Area 
The soils on the slopes of Mt. Meru and Mt. Kilimanjaro are volcanic and have high-
to-medium levels of fertility. The regions have a bimodal rain pattern, with the 
“long” rains occurring between March and May and “short” rains between October 
and December (Haan 2001). On average, Hai district gets between 500 to 800 
millimeters (mm) of rain per year, while Arumeru gets somewhat more, with 
averages for the district over 1,000 mm of rain per year (Mansoor and Piters 1999). 
Smallholders traditionally plant food crops during both seasons, but in recent years, 
the short rains have been unreliable, starting later than usual and often without the 
same level of rainfall as in the past. This is especially true for groups in lower 
elevation areas that include many of the groups in Hai district living on the plains 
between the mountain ranges.  
The total area of Arumeru is 2,896 square kilometers (sq. km), with a 
population of 516,814 and a population density of 181 people per sq. km. Hai is a 
smaller district covering a total area of 2,186 sq. km, with a population of 259,958 
and a population density of 117 people per sq. km. (R & AWG 2005). Of the 199 
districts in Tanzania, both Hai and Arumeru are in the top 20 districts with the 
lowest levels of poverty. In Arumeru district, 18 percent of the households are 
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in the Hai district (R & AWG 2005).
2  
Farmer Group Selection Process 
Based on IFAD’s mandate to target the rural poor, AMSDP provided a list of criteria 
to be used by the PAs and district office in their selection of project areas and 
farmer groups. The criteria included the following: 
•  Project participants should already be involved in farming and/or trading. 
•  The average cropped area of smallholders within producer groups should 
not exceed 2 hectares (ha). 
•  About 50 percent of group members should be from the poorer 
households with an income below the poverty line. 
•  At least 40 percent of the beneficiaries of the group should be women and 
female-headed households. 
•  At least one crop with high market potential should have been identified 
for cultivation and local trade. 
•  Access roads to areas of production should exist and within reasonable 
reach from the main access road. 
•  A minimum critical mass should exist in relation to the proposed 
marketing activity with similar marketing aspirations. 
•  The group members should live and operate within walking distance of 
one another and be willing to collaborate in specific activities, such as 
training. 
Even though the PAs were expected to use these guidelines in their selection 
process, both FAIDA and TIP admit it was impossible to meet all the criteria 
because of the reality facing smallholder farmers. The program aims to work with 
poor farmers who have crops with market potential and good access to roads. The 
problem is that in reality most poor farmers do not have crops with market 
potential and generally live in areas with poor road access. The PAs also had 
difficulty implementing the criteria because of local politics. Each district office (DO) 
had its own agenda when deciding which areas and groups should be chosen for the 
project, but the decision had more to do with pleasing the DO and its local 
constituents than meeting specified criteria. 
In Arumeru district where TIP was operating, the DO chose the most 
politically expedient path by selecting a producer group from each ward.
3 In some 
cases, an existing producer group was chosen to represent the ward. In other 
cases, smaller groups were told to provide representatives to establish a ward-level 
group. The decision by the DO to spread the project over the entire district may 
have pleased a wide array of constituents, especially during a presidential election 
year, but it provided a logistical and financial nightmare for TIP. The final set of 
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per adult equivalent per day, which is the equivalent of US$0.33 (R & AWG 2005).  
3 Political divisions in Tanzania in descending order from the regional level (for example, the 
Kilimanjaro or Arusha regions) include districts, wards, villages, hamlets, and “ten cells” (blocks of 10 
households within a hamlet). 
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market potential, but, as a consequence, TIP had only a few groups with members 
who fit the criterion of coming from poorer households. 
FAIDA also had to struggle over the selection process with the government 
authorities in Hai district. In this case, the DO decided that AMSDP would be a good 
follow up project to the Participatory Agricultural Development Project (PADEP), 
another government-led project that was currently operating in the district. From 
2002 to 2006, PADEP established a number of village-level producer groups and 
provided production-oriented trainings, along with two years of agricultural input 
loans. PADEP also carried out some infrastructural improvement projects at the 
village level, dealing mostly with repairing traditional irrigation schemes. Given the 
fact that PADEP was production-related and AMSDP was market-oriented, it seemed 
to be an excellent match. Logistically, it also would have been easier to conduct 
training activities since most of the farmer groups were located in just four villages. 
The problem for FAIDA was that these groups had little potential in terms of 
marketable crops, and most of these villages were not located in areas with the 
appropriate agroecological conditions or proper infrastructure that would attract 
agricultural companies.  
Partner Agency Training Activities for Farmer Groups 
When PAs were first contracted to train farmer groups, there were few guidelines 
from AMSDP. Thus, each PA was given a certain level of flexibility to decide the 
subject content and how to conduct the different training activities. Nonetheless, 
FAIDA and TIP had more similarities than differences in their training content and 
style. There were a number of training activities that could be classified as group 
strengthening training. Although the timing or grouping of these training activities 
may have differed, both PAs essentially covered the following subject areas with 
their farmer groups: 
•  Group registration 
•  Communication and group dynamics 
•  Group record keeping 
•  Leadership  
•  Administrative and financial management 
•  Setting up a bank account 
•  Establishing action plans 
•  Establishing savings and credit cooperatives 
Each PA also provided business awareness and marketing skills training that 
included such topic areas as: 
•  Farm record keeping 
•  Cost–benefit analysis 
•  Accessing market information 
•  Negotiating prices 
•  Choosing an enterprise and finding potential markets/buyers. 
•  Contract farming  
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Beyond these training activities, each PA also arranged study tours for group 
representatives to visit farmer-formed saving and credit cooperatives (SACCOs). 
Some of the groups also had the opportunity to go on production-related study 
tours to visit other farmers growing a particular crop with market potential or to 
visit agriculture research institutes to get training on modern farming/livestock 
techniques. 
4.  RESEARCH METHODS 
To assess the effect of the intervention on producer group outcomes, a pretest-
posttest research design was utilized (Johnson 1998). The pretest observations 
(that is, the first round of interviews) were conducted as the groups were 
undergoing training from the PAs. Six to eight months later at the conclusion of the 
intervention, the same groups underwent posttest assessment (that is, the second 
round of interviews) to ascertain any changes in their market situation. Because the 
study did not start before the intervention, considerable time was spent during the 
first interview to assess a group’s baseline position on marketing and to allow 
sufficient room in the second round of interviews for the groups to comment on 
how the intervention had changed or had not changed their market situation. 
Conceptual Model  
A conceptual model was developed to understand and explain the flow of the 
planned change process under study. The model utilizes the terminology and 
perspectives of cultural materialism (Harris 1979). By including certain factors 
under the infrastructure and social structure, the model tries to separate and 
analyze the determining factors from the enabling or constraining factors that affect 
group marketing performance. The wider and determinate infrastructure 
encapsulates this planned changed initiative and includes such factors as the 
smallholder groups’ farming systems, the agroecological conditions under which 
they must work, and their physical access to markets—for example, distance to 
markets, access to feeder roads, conditions of roads, and so on (Figure 2). 
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Farmer groups are represented under the social structure; this includes a 
number of factors that will affect a group’s ability to enact successful collective 
action initiatives (that is, the group’s asset configurations, composition, and 
characteristics). The PAs are intervening to enhance human capital in form of 
marketing skills, business acumen, and other group capacity trainings, which is 
represented by the solid line going from the PA directly to the social structure. 
Along with these training activities, the PAs are also providing some groups with 
market linkages to other chain actors; this is represented by the dotted line going 
to the collective action initiative, as well as the lines connecting PA intervention to 
market chain actors. Farmer groups are also carrying out collective action initiatives 
without direct linkages from the PA, which is represented by the lines connecting 
the collective action initiatives to the market chain actors. The performance 
outcomes represent the extent that groups have improved their market situation 
and resulted in positive livelihood outcomes for the members of their groups. 
Study Sample 
The sample for this study comprised 34 groups with a mean size of 35 members 
(Table 1). In terms of membership sampled, 37 percent of all the group members 
working with FAIDA and 29 percent of all the group members working with TIP 
participated in the first round of interviews. Thus, the total study sample represents 
33 percent of all group members. These group members attended the group 
interviews and filled out questionnaires about themselves and their households.  
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  FAIDA TIP  Sample  total 
Sample details  Number   % Number    % Number % 
Sample  size  16  18  34  


















Total  membership  507  678   1,185   
Total membership sampled  189      37  199      29 388 33 
Dependent Variable: Group Marketing Performance 
As the primary dependent variable of this study, a marketing performance rating 
(MPR) was constructed to ascertain the extent to which the groups showed any 
concrete signs that their market situation had improved through the project 
intervention. Each group was given a marketing performance rating ranging from 0 
to 2, with 0 signifying no improvement, 1 signifying some improvement, and 2 
signifying large improvement in their market situation. The MPR scale was 
established in the following manner: 
No Improvement 
Groups were given this rating if, from their own admission, they felt that the project 
intervention had led to little meaningful improvement in their market situation. 
Some groups did feel that the training activities were beneficial to them and that, 
given the right circumstances, they could have used these trainings to improve 
their situation. However, by the end of the study and project cycle, none of these 
groups could provide concrete examples of such trainings making a difference in 
their market situation. 
Some Improvement  
Groups were given this rating by showing that they had the ability to take the 
training activities and successfully put them into practice. Such groups were able to 
provide concrete examples of how their market situation had improved from 
participation in the project. Examples included increased sales and higher prices for 
existing products, more reliable sales markets through enhanced relational or 
formal contract farming arrangements, diversification into higher value crops, 
increased access to market information and bargaining power, involvement in 
postharvest value-adding activities, and participation and increased profits by 
involving themselves in more chain management activities. 
Large Improvement 
A few groups showed the ability to improve their market situation and did this at a 
level of success that separated them from the other groups. In most cases, these 
groups showed striking market improvements by initiating several collective action 
initiatives. As an example, one group shifted their production to more profit-making 
enterprises, shortened the market chain between the group and retailers by taking 
over transportation activities, and entered into farming contract arrangements with 
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market for their crops.  
Explanatory Variables 
Improved marketing performance is an outcome of a number of endogenous and 
exogenous factors. A number of explanatory variables affecting MPR were identified 
a priori based on the literature reviewed in the previous section.
4 Table 2 
categorizes the explanatory variables, by factor domains, in reference to the study’s 
conceptual model.  
Table 2. Explanatory variables categorized by factor domains 
Infrastructure Social  structure 
Partner agency 
intervention 
Market Access   Group Assets   Partner agency  
 Distance to market   Wealth ranking  Agency linkage 
 Road conditions   Education   
   Providers/Partners   
Agroecological Factors   Membership in other groups   
 Commodity types  Altruism   
 Reliable water source  Intragroup trust (three variables)   
 Land  Group composition/characteristics    
   Group maturity   
   Group size   
   Activity  level   
   Gender categories   
   Leadership by sex   
 Group  Heterogeneity   
   Educational   
   Gender   
   Wealth   
 
The infrastructure domain takes into account the physical market access and 
agroecological factors, which are represented by five variables: distance to 
markets, road conditions, commodity types, reliable water source, and land. The 
distance to markets variable measures the distance from group meeting place to 
the major market in the region, which for the FAIDA groups is the town of Moshi in 
the Kilimanjaro region, and for the TIP groups it is the town of Arusha in the 
Arumeru Region. The “commodity types” variable refers to the crops grown by 
group members that were put forward as a possible agroenterprise venture, and 
delineates between those groups that grow traditional staple food crops (that is, 
cereals and legumes) to those groups dealing in other commodities (that is, 
vegetables, coffee, livestock, and rice). The social structure domain takes into 
account several explanatory variables that represent group assets, group 
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  11 composition and characteristics,
5 and group heterogeneity. Under the group assets 
heading, the “providers/partners” and “membership in other groups” variables are 
used to represent structural social capital
6 and the altruism,
7 and three intragroup 
trust variables (that is, general trust, help trust, and money trust) are used to 
represent cognitive social capital.
8 The PA intervention domain takes into account 
which PA the farmer groups worked with and whether or not the groups were 
actively linked to other market chain actors in an effort to improve their market 
situation.  
5.  MARKETING OBSTACLES 
During the first round of group interviews, each group was asked about the 
prevailing marketing issues that constrained their ability to improve their market 
situation. Table 3 provides a list of the most frequently mentioned marketing 
obstacles facing each of the PA groups. 
 Table 3. Marketing obstacles by partner agency groups 
FAIDA marketing obstacles  TIP marketing obstacles 
1.  Bad roads/high transportation costs  1.  Bad roads/high transportation costs 
2.  Low prices for produce  2.  No special place to sell crops 
3.  No market information  3.  Lack of capital 
4.  Lack of special measuring equipment  4.  No reliable markets 
5.  Lack of storage houses  5.  Lack of storage houses 
6.  No reliable markets  6.  Unreliable agricultural inputs 
7.  Lack of capital  7.  High customs duty in market place 
                                                      
5 The group maturity variable refers to whether a group existed prior to the intervention or was 
newly formed for the purposes of the intervention. The leadership by sex variable is the proportion of 
male to female elected leaders in a group. The activity level variable refers to the number of 
effectively operating internal activities that a group runs. The type of activities that they were involved 
in prior to the intervention, included rotating credit schemes, collective marketing, bulk input 
purchasing, labor-sharing activities, and group farms—for purposes of consumption or collective 
marketing but also including seedling nurseries and demonstration plots for experiential learning.  
6 The providers/partners variable refers to the number of service providers and/or business 
partners the group has worked with prior to the intervention. In order not to bias results for groups 
that have been existence for a longer period of time, the total number of providers/partners was 
divided by the number of years of the group’s existence. The “membership in other groups” variable 
refers only to membership in other agriculture and development-oriented groups.  
7 The “altruism” variable was based on group members playing a one-shot “public goods game” 
(PPG). Higher group scores represent more altruistic behavior, while lower scores represent groups 
with more self-interested behavior.  
8 Three statements concerning intragroup trust were presented on the questionnaire using a 
three-point Likert scale, with participants responding that they (1) agreed with the statement; (2) felt 
neutral about the statement; or (3) disagreed with the statement. They responded to the following 
three statements: (1) most members in your group can be trusted (General Trust); (2) most members 
in your group are willing to help if you need it (Help Trust); and (3) in your group, members can 
generally trust each other in matters of lending and borrowing money (Money Trust). These answers 
were then coded from 1 to 3 and aggregated to the group level to provide three general 
measurements of intragroup trust. A full description of all the explanatory variables used in this study 
can be found in Appendix A. 
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Both FAIDA and TIP groups share some of the same marketing obstacles that 
include bad roads/high transportation costs, lack of storage houses, lack of capital, 
and no reliable market. The first three are self-explanatory but “reliable” market 
deserves more attention. Many of the groups talked about not having a reliable 
market. Groups were often asked how they would define a reliable market, and 
most definitions centered on having markets where the farmers could get a 
consistently fair or good price for produce year round. Coming from a state-led 
economy where marketing boards and fixed prices on staple crops was the norm 
until the early 1990s, many farmers still clearly remember the days of this form of 
a “reliable” market. But when groups were asked if they would prefer to return to 
this system, all groups rejected any notion of returning to the state-intervening 
marketing days. Every group preferred the open market economy where a farmer 
could produce and sell what she or he wanted, but many of the groups also 
expressed their frustration with volatile and low market prices, as well as with 
monopsonistic marketing channels (that is, many producers and only a few traders 
dominating the channel) for some of their commodities, especially cereals and 
legumes. 
Marketing obstacles most frequently mentioned that were specific to the 
FAIDA groups included low prices for produce, no market information, and the 
absence of special measuring equipment. In regard to the third obstacle, the lack of 
special measuring equipment refers to the fact that most produce is bought and 
sold by volume rather than by weight. The major complaint of farmers involves the 
issue of rumbesa—large sacks used by rural assemblers and wholesalers. The 
sacks, which are filled with produce and closed using a stitched top layer of sack 
material, are fairly uniform and can hold approximately 80 kilograms of maize. But 
the top layer that encloses the sack varies by trader and can hold anywhere from 
10 to 40 kilograms more. It is this top layer that causes the greatest amount of 
friction because farmers constantly accuse traders of underpaying them. This can 
be conveyed more clearly through a picture (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Onions packed in rumbesa 
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The government has attempted to tackle this issue on the behalf of farmers. 
During the course of this study, the government passed a law that requires all 
wholesale markets to start buying and selling produce by weight instead of by 
volume. But the law has yet to be implemented and faces fierce opposition by 
agricultural traders. The whole marketing system revolves around trade in 
volume—from the rural assemblers who pack the rumbesa, to the transporters who 
fix prices based on the number of rumbesa carried, to the wholesalers who buy and 
sell based on rumbesa, and even to the government’s own system of taxation, 
which bases produce taxes on volume. Any effort to implement this new legislation 
will first require the government to completely overhaul its taxation system. But, at 
the present time, the government has neither the financial will to pay for the 
necessary measuring equipment nor the political will to confront the myriad chain 
actors who are vehemently opposed to these measures. 
Another marketing obstacle mentioned by the FAIDA groups, but one that 
certainly applies to all groups, is a lack of market information, which refers to 
information on prevailing prices, quality standards, and quantity demands. Every 
group was asked how they obtained market information; four ways of getting this 
information were mentioned. The most common method was by simply talking to 
other people in the village—either from those who had already sold their produce at 
farm gate or to those who had recently returned from the market place. The second 
way was to go to the market themselves, but this often meant just accepting 
whatever prices the wholesalers or retailers were offering. The third way was to talk 
to rural assemblers/traders in the area, but the groups did say they rarely trusted 
the information provided.  
The fourth way was through the use of technology, namely radios and mobile 
phones. In the study sample of 388 farmers, 91 percent own a radio and 38 
percent own a mobile phone. It is also worth mentioning that every group had at 
least one member with a mobile phone, but few group members felt that these 
technologies were useful for accessing market information. There are weekly radio 
broadcasts that give market information on the major Tanzanian markets, but 
farmers considered this information totally useless because the markets concerned 
are outside their reach, and local prices in their area are rarely the same as in these 
larger markets. In regard to mobile phones, a few group members said that they 
used their phones to contact rural assemblers, wholesalers, or retailers—as well as 
relatives and friends who live near an area market—to find out about market prices, 
but this was more the exception than the rule. 
Returning to other marketing obstacles, TIP-specific constraints include the 
lack of special place to sell crops, high customs duty, and unreliable agricultural 
inputs. Beginning with the third obstacle, many farmers are constrained by lack of 
access to timely and appropriate agricultural inputs (primarily fertilizers and 
pesticides). This constraint was vocalized most strongly by vegetable farmers who 
have great difficulties accessing the appropriate inputs to fight pests and disease. 
The other two obstacles—no special place to sell crops and high customs duty—are 
interrelated and deal with problems farmers face when trying to sell directly to 
wholesalers and retailers. If farmers go to the market to sell their crops to 
wholesalers or retailers, they must first pay tax to the marketing officials. Given 
what the farmers perceive to be high taxes, coupled with the transportation costs 
  14 incurred in bringing their produce to the market, many farmers would rather sell 
their crops to rural assemblers at the farmgate. However, any farmer wishing to 
sell directly to the consumer in these market places must obtain a permit to do so 
from the market officials. This precipitates the issue of having no special place to 
sell crops, first, because the permit is just one more cost that many farmers cannot 
afford, and, second, because many market places have reached their spatial 
capacity and are not issuing any more permits. 
Gender-Specific Marketing Obstacles 
During the group interview discussion on marketing obstacles, the question was 
posed as to whether or not there were specific constraints affecting men or women 
more directly. The most frequent response was that women were more affected by 
most of the marketing obstacles because they assume primary marketing 
responsibility in the household. More often than not, women will negotiate with 
rural assemblers over farmgate prices or go to the market to sell their produce to 
wholesalers and retailers. Several groups, particularly the female-only and female-
dominated groups, provided some specific examples of the constraints they faced. 
The most frequent comment from women on specific marketing obstacles revolved 
around transportation difficulties. These included the high costs of hiring transport 
and, as a consequence, having to carry the produce to market themselves. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that even if their household owns a bicycle, it would be 
culturally inappropriate for a woman to ride it, and thus it is of no use as a means 
of transporting their produce. Another frequent constraint women face is 
harassment by market and health officials. Because they either can’t afford permits 
or permits are not available, many women are forced to sell outside the market 
place, oftentimes nearby so that customers can see them. But, if market and health 
officials catch them, they confiscate the produce and forcefully remove the women 
from the area. As a consequence, many women complain of having to get up very 
early in the morning to sell produce before the market and health officials arrive. 
Women also spoke about being burdened with productive and reproductive 
activities that gave little time to seek other market opportunities, which often 
forced them to sell their produce at whatever price buyers offered. Women also 
complained that erratic market prices were causing friction and conflict between 
them and their husbands, manifesting, for example, in situations where a husband 
anticipates a certain crop price and accuses the woman of withholding money if she 
returns from the market with less than expected. Some women said that this led to 
increased conflict in the household and, in some cases, to spousal abuse. 
Matching Marketing Obstacles to Livelihood Constraints 
On a conceptual level, the marketing obstacles that farmers face relate to a lack of 
livelihood assets that would allow them to overcome these constraints, which is 
particularly true for women. It is important to equate livelihood assets to certain 
marketing obstacles to ascertain the extent that the PA intervention of capacity 
training activities can be effective in overcoming their constraints and improving 
their market situation (Table 4).  
  15 Table 4. Livelihood asset constraints by farmer group marketing obstacles 
Natural assets  Physical assets  Financial assets  Human assets  Social assets 








No reliable market  Lack of 
measuring 
equipment 
Lack of capital    Low prices for 
produce 
Low prices for 
produce 











As the table shows, several of the marketing obstacles overlap with livelihood 
asset constraints. The marketing obstacles of no reliable market and low prices for 
produce are a function of a lack of both natural and social assets. Farmers must 
contend with a given set of agroecological conditions that will limit their ability to 
improve their market competitiveness. If farmers can only grow crops that lack 
market demand, it will be difficult for them to get good prices or secure a reliable 
market for their produce. But, there may be farmers with favorable agroecological 
conditions that only lack the marketing contacts (that is, social assets) that could 
secure them with better prices and a more reliable market. 
Similarly, lack of market information is a combination of human and social 
asset constraints. To gain knowledge (that is, human assets) about prices, quality 
standards, and commodity demands requires developing relationships with chain 
actors who can provide them with reliable and timely information. Some of the 
livelihood assets match more clearly with specific marketing obstacles. For 
example, the obstacles of no place to sell crops, and lack of storage houses and 
measuring equipment are largely a function of physical asset constraints. Likewise, 
financial assets constraints match with marketing obstacles of high transport costs, 
high market taxes, and lack of capital. But when it comes to unreliable agricultural 
inputs, this issue could be a function of financial asset constraints (that is, not 
being able to afford the right inputs) and physical assets constraints (that is, being 
to far from market centers where they could access these inputs more easily). 
Obviously, it is difficult to make clear distinctions between these livelihood asset 
constraints and marketing obstacles, and there are number of interrelated assets 
and marketing obstacles that could be debated further. But, the primary purpose is 
to highlight the areas where the PA intervention may prove most successful in 
improving the market situation of the farmer groups. It must be remembered that 
the PAs were tasked with delivering capacity-building training (that is, enhancing 
human assets) and where possible, to link the farmer groups to other market chain 
actors (that is, enhancing social capital). As the next section of results shows, 
certain asset and attribute configurations made some of the groups better suited to 
benefit from the PA intervention.   
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Group Marketing Performance Results 
Through a number of collective action measures, 19 farmer groups (56 percent) 
improved their market situation. Thirteen farmer groups had some market 
improvement with a MPR of 1, and six groups had large improvements with a MPR 
of 2. TIP fared better than FAIDA with two-thirds of their groups (67 percent) 
improving their situation whereas FAIDA saw less than half of their groups (44 
percent) showing improvement. TIP also had five of their groups see large 
improvements in their market situation, whereas only one of the FAIDA groups had 
this outcome. 
Table 5. Marketing performance rating by partner agency 










Partner agency          
FAIDA  9 6 1  16 
TIP  6 7 5  18 
Number of farmer groups  15  13  6  34 
Underlying Factors Affecting Group Marketing Performance 
A number of group assets, characteristics, and other explanatory variables were 
tested to ascertain how these might play a determining factor in group marketing 
performance. Tests of association and correlation (ANOVA and Pearson’s R) were 
conducted to analyze the statistical significance of mean values between farmer 
groups (Table 6).
9  
                                                      
9 While this paper goes beyond the traditional case-study approach to examining collective action 
with data analyses on 34 groups, this sample size is still not large enough to render statistically 
reliable results from multivariate analyses.   
  17 Table 6. Test of significance using ANOVA and Pearson’s R 
Explanatory Variables  N  F statistic  R statistic  P value  Test 
Infrastructure          
Market access          
Distance to market  34    –0.175  0.322  Pearson's R 
Road conditions  34  0.066    0.936  ANOVA 
Agroecological factors           
Commodity types  34  4.670    0.005***  ANOVA 
Reliable water source  34  19.806    0.000***  ANOVA 
Land 32    0.097  0.596  Pearson's  R 
Social structure           
Group assets           
Wealth ranking  34    0.199  0.260  Pearson's R 
Education 34    0.313  0.072*  Pearson's  R 
Providers/partners 34    –0.048  0.788  Pearson's  R 
Membership in other groups  32    0.068  0.710  Pearson's R 
Altruism 34    –0.030  0.867  Pearson's  R 
General trust   32    –0.099  0.590  Pearson's R 
Help trust  32    –0.033  0.859  Pearson's R 
Money trust  32    0.049  0.792  Pearson's R 
Group composition/characteristics 
Maturity 34  4.375    0.045**  ANOVA 
Size of group
a 33    0.106  0.557  Pearson's  R 
Activity level  34    0.579  0.000***  Pearson's R 
Gender categories  34  0.411    0.747  ANOVA 
Leadership by sex  34    0.281  0.108  Pearson's R 
Group Heterogeneity            
Educational 34    –0.147  0.406  Pearson's  R 
Gender 34    0.182  0.304  Pearson's  R 
Wealth 34    0.073  0.681  Pearson's  R 
Partner agency intervention           
Partner agency  34  3.160    0.085*  ANOVA 
Partner agency linkages  34  2.753    0.107  ANOVA 
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; due to the small sample size (n=34), all independent 
variables with a p value below 0.10 are considered statistically significant. These tests of significance 
are being used primarily to bring attention to certain variables that warrant further examination and 
discussion. 
aThe “size of group” statistic excludes one group because it acts as an extreme outlier. This group has 
150 members, and including them would disproportionately affect the results. 
There are six variables that are statistically significant (p<0.10) and two 
other variables that are marginally significant (p<0.11).
 Those variables most 
strongly associated with improved marketing performance include reliable water 
source, activity level, and commodity types. Group maturity, partner agency, and 
education variables are also statistically significant factors in improved marketing 
performance. Likewise, PA linkages and leadership by sex show some association 
with improved performance that warrants further examination.  
  18 7.  DISCUSSION  
The following tables provide descriptive statistics of the significant factors 
associated with improved group marketing performance, which are categorized by 
the factor domains of the study’s conceptual model (that is, Infrastructure, Social 
Structure, and PA Intervention).
10 A marketing performance rating (MPR) is 
represented for groups with no market improvement as 0; for groups with some 
improvement as 1; and groups with large market improvement as 2. Groups are 
also shown by “market improvement” that classifies groups into those that did and 
did not improve their market situation.  
Table 7. Infrastructure variables associated with improved marketing 
performance  




Explanatory variables   0 1 2      No Yes  %  Improved 
Reliable  water  source              
Yes   3  9  6  3  15  84 
No    12 4 0  12 4  25 
Commodity  types            
Cereals/legumes    10 4 0  10 4  29 
Coffee    2 0 1  2 1  33 
Livestock    3 1 1  3 2  40 
Rice    0 1 1  0 2  100 
Vegetables/fruit   0  7  3  0  10  100 
Reliable Water Source 
Eighty-four percent of the groups with market improvements had a reliable water 
source. There is little question that when groups rely solely on rainfed agriculture, 
they face a more limited range of opportunities to exploit market potentials and 
improve their situation. It is also worth noting that all six groups with a MPR of 2, 
or large market improvements, had access to a reliable water source. This is not to 
say that such improvements cannot be made, as evidenced by the four groups that 
were able to do this without a reliable water source. But in all of these cases, water 
was not as much of a limiting factor to improving their marketing performance as it 
was to other groups. In two such cases, the chosen commodity did not require a 
reliable water source. The first group increased their bargaining position and sales 
by breeding modern variety chickens; and the second group rented a grain storage 
house and sold their maize at higher prices later in the season. The other two 
groups in this sample entered a contract with an agricultural company to grow 
artemisia.
11 This company had already decided on the territorial area for artemisia 
production, for which, though based partially on area percentages of rainfall, the 
two major factors were proper soil types and the availability of land. Both groups 
                                                      
10See Appendix B for a full description of the explanatory variables by group marketing 
performance. 
11Artemisia, or Artemisia annua, is an herbal plant that is processed into artemisinin, which is used 
in the treatment of malaria.  
  19 were located in the chosen production area, and both had access to land for 
expanded production. 
Commodity Types  
This variable proved to be statistically significant because certain crops have 
greater market potential, especially in local markets. Cereals and legumes, 
particularly maize and beans, are the traditional staple food crops for many 
smallholder growers. When these staple food crops are grown on a large scale with 
an eye toward regional and international markets (that is, Kenya and Uganda), they 
offer substantial market potential. But, most farmer groups lack both the 
production scale and the market contacts to exploit these regional and international 
markets. Only 4 of 14 groups promoting cereals/legumes as an agroenterprise 
improved their market situation. Even this finding is misleading, since two of these 
groups improved their market situation by entering in contracts with 
agribusinesses—one group growing artemisia and the other growing flower seeds—
essentially replacing part of their maize and bean crop with these cash crops. The 
other two groups improved their market situation through maize: one by storing its 
maize crop in bulk and attaining a higher price later in the season, the other by a 
combination of bulk purchasing (of hybrid seed and fertilizer) and collectively 
marketing the harvest to a new buyer. These two groups succeeded because of 
their capacity to mobilize the required capital investments at the beginning of the 
growing season, which for most of the groups in this study is beyond their present 
capacity. 
Another significant finding is that all ten groups promoting vegetables and 
fruits saw their market situation improve. The more obvious reason for the success 
of these groups lies in the substantial market demand for these crops, but the less 
obvious reason is that it appears the PA training was particularly suited to 
exploiting market potentials of the commodities in question. Training in such areas 
as cost–benefit analysis and negotiation skills allowed many of the groups to 
reorient their production to the more profitable vegetable and fruit crops and to use 
their newly acquired negotiation skills to bargain for higher prices. But these 
findings also point to the larger issue of agroecology and farming systems. Many 
farmers grow cereals and legumes because it is simply what the land can support, 
especially where there is no reliable water source and they must rely solely on 
rainfed agriculture. This can be more clearly understood by distinguishing between 
groups growing traditional food crops and those growing the other, higher value 
and nonstaple food crops. Only 29 percent of the groups growing staple food crops 
have a reliable water source while 70 percent of the groups growing nonstaple food 
crops have a reliable water source. With the existing natural asset constraints, 
many of the groups growing cereals and legumes are simply not in a position to 
pursue a variety of marketing strategy alternatives that would allow them to exploit 
existing and emerging market potentials, even with the most well-intentioned 






  20 Table 8. Social structure variables associated with improved marketing 
performance 
  Marketing performance rating  Market improvement 
Explanatory variables    0  1  2      No Yes  %  Improved 
Activity  level    0.53 1.46 2.17  0.53  1.68  
Maturity             
Newly formed groups    8  6  0  8  6  43 
Existing  groups    7 7 6  7  13  65 
Leadership by sex    0.49  0.60  0.71  0.49  0.64   
Education    6.6 7.1 7.6  6.6  7.2  
Activity Level  
An important finding under the social structure domain is that groups with a greater 
number of activities were more likely to improve their market situation. Eighty-four 
percent of the groups with improved marketing performance had at least one group 
activity. Even more telling is that 10 out of 19 groups with market improvement 
had two or more activities, whereas none of the groups with no market 
improvement had more than one group activity. Although not quite expected, this 
finding makes sense in the context of marketing performance. When observing the 
groups in this study, there is a certain vitality that exists in groups that have 
functioning group activities. It gives groups an ongoing sense of identity and 
purpose that defines the group beyond the projects in which they are participating. 
Furthermore, sustaining these activities requires the group to establish internal 
institutions to guide the effective coordination and mobilization of group resources. 
Such traits can be particularly useful for groups attempting to leverage group 
resources quickly to meet emerging market potentials. 
Group Maturity 
The maturity of the group refers to whether groups were newly formed at the 
beginning of the project or already existing. Sixty-five percent of the existing 
groups (13 out of 20) were able to improve their market situation compared to less 
than half of the newly formed groups (43 percent). This finding is associated with 
the “activity level” variable as well, since those with maturity and functioning group 
activities will be better positioned to mobilize group resources and take advantage 
of emerging market opportunities than groups that have just started and lack such 
experience in both resource mobilization and coordination. For the newly formed 
groups that did improve their market situation, four groups did so by entering in 
contract arrangements with agribusinesses. Under this situation, they were less in 
need of a cohesive or mature group, and relied instead on the strength and 
connections of their leaders, as well on the right agroecological conditions to meet 
the agricultural companies’ criteria and the PA’s help in establishing these linkages. 
Leadership by Sex  
The data show that groups with a greater ratio of male to female leaders are more 
likely to improve their market situation. A related finding is that even though there 
are not many differences among the gender categories, the one exception is the 
  21 category of male-dominated groups.
12 Where the rest of the categories show a 
fairly even mix of groups with and without improvement, in the category of m
dominated groups, 75 percent of the groups (six out of eight) showed improved 
marketing performance. These finding show that female-only groups often find 
themselves in a disadvantaged position compared to their male counterparts when 
it comes to searching for and accessing new markets for their existing products, 
and possibly even more so in pursuing new products, as would be found under 
contract arrangements. One reason these “new market” resource channels are 
easier to access by men is that they are more likely to be approached by 
agricultural companies or other chain actors wanting to do business. Men are 
approached more than women because it is assumed—often wrongly—that they are 
the primary producer in the household and thus deemed the primary decision-
maker in such areas as contract arrangements or service provision delivery. This 
also stems from the fact the more men are in position of authority in the villages, 
either as elected or traditionally selected community leaders. External change 
agents (that is, agribusinesses, agricultural extension, community development 
officers, NGOs) usually approach community leaders first when looking to start new 




The findings under education prove to be statistically significant with those groups 
with no market improvement having averaged less than seven years of schooling, 
versus those groups with improvement having averaged over seven years of 
schooling. This is important because it reveals that groups whose members have 
some secondary education were more likely to improve their market situation over 
groups where members have only primary education. Furthermore, given the fact 
that this intervention dealt primarily with human capacity training, groups with 
higher education levels were most likely able to absorb more content and put more 
ideas into practice to improve their market situation. 
Table 9. Partner agency intervention variables associated with improved 
marketing performance 




Explanatory variables    0  1  2      No Yes  %  Improved 
Partner  agency              
FAIDA     9  6  1  9  7  44 
TIP   6  7  5  6  12  67 
Partner agency linkage               
Linked   3  7  3  3  10  77 
Not linked    12  6  3  12  9  43 
                                                      
12See Appendix B for the full description of gender category variables by group marketing 
performance.  
  22 Partner Agency and Agency Linkages  
As previously mentioned, each partner agency had varying levels of success 
improving the marketing performance of the respective farmer groups. TIP fared 
better than FAIDA with two-thirds of its groups (67 percent) improving their 
situation whereas FAIDA saw less than half of its groups (44 percent) showing 
improvement. TIP also had five of its groups show large improvements in their 
market situation, whereas only one of the FAIDA groups had this outcome. TIP and 
FAIDA together were involved in actively linking thirteen groups to other chain 
actors. Ten of these groups (77 percent) that were actively linked improved their 
market situation. The reason for TIP’s higher success rate can be explained by the 
fact that more of their groups had at their disposal a greater share of collective 
resources that could be harnessed to affect positive change in their market 
situation. More often the case than not, TIP groups were better educated, had more 
internal cohesion (as represented by the greater number of group activities and 
level of maturity), were endowed with more natural assets (that is, more land and 
reliable water sources), and worked with commodities that had greater market 
potential. These asset differences between TIP and FAIDA also explain why TIP had 
more opportunities to actively link their groups to other chain actors. TIP initiated 
linkages of nine farmer groups with other chain actors (seven led to an improved 
market situation), whereas FAIDA initiated linkages of four farmer groups with 
other chain actors (three led to an improved market situation). 
8.  HYPOTHESES REVISITED  
In this section, the study hypotheses are revisited to ascertain the extent that they 
can be supported or rejected based on the results of the bivariate analyses. The 
first set of hypotheses is discussed under the heading of group assets, and the 
second set of hypotheses is discussed under the heading of group composition and 
characteristics.  
Hypotheses Relating to Group Assets  
Farmer groups will be better positioned to improve their marketing performance if 
the group has some or all of the following attributes: 
•  High level of trust among members (Hypothesis 1) 13  
•  More altruistic rather than self-interested behavior (Hypothesis 2)  
•  More ties to other organizations in and outside the community 
(Hypothesis 3) 
•  Lower levels of poverty (Hypothesis 4)
14 
                                                      
13 The first three hypotheses are concerned with assessing the effects of social capital and were 
tested using the following variables: General trust, Help trust, Money trust, and Altruism (as indicators 
of cognitive social capital); and Providers/Partners and Membership in other groups (as indicators of 
structural social capital). 
14 This hypothesis was tested by using the following variables: Wealth ranking, Reliable water 
source, Land, Education, and Commodity types. These variables encapsulate four of the five livelihood 
assets (physical, natural, financial, human).  
  23 Beginning with the hypothesis relating to levels of poverty, bivariate analysis 
highlighted the importance of natural assets—water and commodity types—as 
significant and meaningful factors toward improved marketing performance. 
Likewise, groups with more years of schooling, especially those where the majority 
of the members had some secondary education, were more likely to improve their 
market situation. Surprisingly, group wealth ranking (a measure of groups’ physical 
and financial assets) did not prove to be a significant factor in a group’s ability to 
improve their market situation. These findings lead to a partial support of 
Hypothesis 4, which can be stated as follows: better educated groups with a good 
stock of natural capital and favorable agroecological conditions (that is, reliable 
water source, commodity types) will be better positioned to improve their 
marketing performance.   
A similar conclusion, however, cannot be put forward in regard to the social 
capital hypotheses, whether in the form of structural or cognitive social capital. In 
the bivariate analysis, neither the proxy indicators for cognitive social capital (that 
is, intragroup trust and altruistic behavior) nor the proxy indicators for structural 
social capital (that is, membership in other groups and providers/partners) were 
proven to be statistically significant factors to improved marketing performance. 
These findings do not, however, counter the hypothesis that trust among members 
is an important attribute toward successful collective action initiatives. Averaging 
the three intragroup trust scores, groups with no market improvement had a total 
trust score of 2.48, and groups with market improvement had a trust score of 2.49. 
Since these scores are virtually the same, they are not statistically significant; more 
importantly, however, they show that practically all groups have a high level of 
trust among their members. 
Hypotheses Relating to Group Composition and Characteristics 
The second set of hypotheses states that farmer groups will be better positioned to 
improve their marketing performance if the group has some or all of the following 
attributes:  
•  Smaller group size (Hypothesis 5) 
•  Past successful activities (Hypothesis 6)
15 
•  Heterogeneity of endowments (Hypothesis 7) 
•  Homogeneity of identities (Hypothesis 8)
16 
Group size did not have any affect on group marketing performance, and thus, 
there is no evidence in this study to support the hypothesis that smaller farmer 
groups will be better positioned to improve their market situation over larger 
groups. In regard to the Hypothesis 6, it is clear from the bivariate analysis that the 
“group maturity” and “activity level” variables are positively associated with a 
group’s ability to improve its market situation. The association was particularly 
strong for the “activity level” variable. Some set of rules must be followed in order 
                                                      
15 Hypothesis 6 was tested using the Maturity and Activity Level variables. These two variables act 
as proxy measures for functioning internal institutions and, by their extension, for the types of 
activities these groups are capable of doing. 
16Hypotheses 7 and 8 were tested using the following variables: leadership by sex, gender 
composition categories, and the three heterogeneity variables (that is, educational, gender, wealth). 
  24 to run successful and sustainable group activities, even more so when a group is 
running multiple group activities. The positive association of group maturity to 
improved marketing performance bolsters this finding. A far greater number of the 
groups in existence before the project intervention were able to implement 
collective action initiatives to improve their market situation. Whereas mature 
groups had a set of formalized or informal institutions to guide group behavior and 
action, the same cannot be said for the newly formed groups. It is the combination 
of functioning internal institutions and successful group activities that provide the 
confidence and willingness for groups to take on new initiatives, and thus it is one 
of the major reasons that these groups were able take the PA trainings and put 
them into practice to improve their market situation.  
In terms of the heterogeneity/homogeneity hypotheses, none of the 
heterogeneity variables in the bivariate analysis proved to be statistically 
significant. There is no evidence from this study sample to support the hypotheses 
that heterogeneity of endowments or homogeneity of identities will better position 
groups to improve their market situation.  
A final finding that does not fit as neatly within the sets of hypotheses but is 
important nonetheless is that groups with a higher proportion of male to female 
leaders in the group were more likely to improve their market situation. Many 
female-only and female-dominated groups (in regard to group gender composition) 
find themselves in a disadvantaged position compared to their male counterparts 
when it comes to searching for and accessing new markets for their existing 
products and possibly even more so in pursuing new products as would be found 
under contract arrangements. Due to culturally ascribed gender roles, women 
assume a greater share of the responsibility over their households’ production and 
reproduction activities. Given these responsibilities, many women simply do not 
have time to spend searching out new market opportunities. This is compounded by 
the fact that women do not have the same sociopolitical networks that men have, 
all of which makes it more difficult for them to access new resources and services 
that could lead to new market opportunities. 
9.  STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
In the final summation of these findings, it is appropriate to return to the 
conceptual model guiding this study. Within the infrastructure domain, the two 
driving forces to improved marketing performance are determined by the 
commodities being promoted as an agroenterprise (that is, growing nonstaple food 
crops) and whether or not the groups have a reliable water source to depend on. 
The findings of this study support the premise that groups endowed with favorable 
agroecological factors, such as a reliable water source, good lands and soils, and 
crops with inherent market potential, are far better positioned to improve their 
market situation. When farmer groups are endowed with this core set of natural 
assets, a great number of marketing strategy alternatives are made available to 
them, whereas groups lacking these natural assets will find their marketing strategy 
alternatives severely limited.  
It is from this perspective that variables in the social structure domain can 
play an enabling role in a group’s ability to take advantage of existing and 
emerging market opportunities. The enabling factors in the social structure domain 
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maturity of the group, number of group activities, a higher proportion of male 
leaders, and better educated groups. Many of the groups that improved their 
market situation had in place the appropriate mechanism for mobilizing group 
assets and action, with confidence from previous positive experiences to see new 
initiatives carried out to their conclusion. The PA intervention in the form of direct 
market linkages was also an important factor in group market success. But it should 
be noted that in most cases the PA was able to link these groups to agribusinesses 
because they were endowed with assets that made the partnership worthwhile for 
the agribusiness. These assets included having a reliable water source and the 
appropriate lands and soils to grow their crops. This final factor bolsters the 
premise of the primacy of the infrastructure. Having the right agroecological 
conditions played a determining factor in the PA’s ability to link these groups to 
other market chain actors.   
Reconsidering the Planned Change Initiative 
The PA intervention attempted to improve the marketing performance of 
smallholder farmer groups by providing group strengthening and marketing skills 
training and, where possible, to link these farmer groups to other market chain 
actors. At the heart of this intervention is the PA’s attempt to create a culture of 
entrepreneurship—the mantra being that farmers need to produce for markets 
rather than trying to market what they produce. On one level, it is about training 
farmers to be more business-oriented, to think of their crops as commodities, and 
to organize group activities as business enterprises. On another level, it urges the 
farmer groups to take more chances and become less risk-averse.  
Understood from this perspective, the PA intervention is a classic example of 
the education model of social change, in which the basic premise is that the way a 
person behaves can be altered by changing the way she or he thinks. Bernard 
(1995, 24) explains some of the pitfalls of this particular behavioral change model.  
 
“The model is based on the idea that thought causes behavior. If you want to 
change people’s behavior, the reasoning goes, you have to change how they think: 
teach men to use condoms; teach women to use birth control devices; teach 
everyone to wash their hands after defecating. The educational model of social 
change creates a lot of employment for researchers and development project 
workers, but it doesn’t produce much in the way of desired change. This is because 
behavioral change (the supposed dependent variable) often doesn’t depend on 
education (the supposed independent variable). In fact, it’s sometimes the other 
way around. When women have access to well-paying jobs outside the home, they 
tend to lower their fertility. Once that happens, an antinatality culture develops.” 
 
Keeping with this example, well-paying jobs would equate in this study with 
farmer groups endowed with good lands, access to a reliable water source, and 
commodities with market potential. With such natural assets, these groups are 
already in a better position to improve their market situation. If such groups could 
be assured that calculated risks would not lead to unrecoverable shocks to their 
livelihood systems, there is a greater likelihood that a culture of entrepreneurship 
would develop naturally. This is where the PA intervention can, and did, have an 
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marketing skills, many of the groups endowed with a core set of natural assets 
were given the confidence to seek out and exploit new market opportunities. 
However, even with these determining forces at work, the role of the social 
structure as an enabling or constraining factor should not be disregarded. Even if 
groups are endowed with natural assets, constraining social structures (such as a 
lack of internal institutions to guide group behavior and action, or discriminatory 
external institutions that place women at a disadvantage when seeking new market 
opportunities) will make these groups far less likely to succeed in marketing 
initiatives to improve their livelihoods.  
There is a final point that should be made categorically: even the most 
organized and trustworthy groups, equipped with the best marketing skills trainings 
possible, will have small likelihood of improving their market situation without the 
requisite set of natural assets. Any intervention that confuses the determinacy of 
the social structure over the infrastructure will not produce, as Bernard says, the 
desired change (Bernard 1995, 24). The matter comes down to distinguishing 
between the determining factors and factors that will enable or constrain successful 
marketing performance outcomes. At the end of the day, telling farmers that they 
should become rural entrepreneurs—that they should be exploiting market 
opportunities rather than being exploited by the market—will fall quickly on deaf 
ears if the asset base and group capacity that are required to engage in the market 
activities are simply missing. 
This does not mean that market-oriented interventions should only target 
“wealthy” farmers and exclude the poor.  It means that promoters of this approach 
must be far more realistic about the time frame by which to expect poor 
smallholder farmers to make substantive gains in their market situation.  This 
certainly requires a project cycle period beyond the typical three years, and it will 
involve substantial asset building in natural and financial capitals (e.g., rotating 
credit schemes), alongside such human and social capital building as promoted in 
AMSDP. This also necessitates change agents to have the appropriate methods and 
tools to assess farmer group’s asset levels and resource mobilization capacity. 
Without these tools, it will always be difficult to discern the level of risk groups 
should be willing to take and the type of collective action initiatives most 
appropriate to bring about significant improvements to their market situation.  This 
is all the more crucial since one of the more dangerous assumptions made by 
market advocates is that promotion of market-oriented interventions will lead to 
greater food security; yet, it is all too clear that failed attempts to engage the 




                                                      
17 See Barham (2007) for a more lengthy discussion on programmatic and policy 
recommendations for engaging smallholder farmers in agro-enterprise development initiatives. 
  27 APPENDIX A 
Description and Values of Explanatory Variables 
Table 1. Group asset variables by description and value 
Explanatory variables  Description    Value 
Physical and natural assets       
Group wealth ranking  Aggregated score taken from 
individual group members 
based on household ownership 
of physical, natural and financial 
assets 
 Continuous:   
Composite index scores 
between 2.00 and 4.33 
The higher the score, the 
higher the group asset level 
Reliable water source  Majority of group members 
having access to reliable water 
source 
 Discrete: 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
Land  Aggregated and average score 
taken from the total amount of 
land (owned and rented) by 
group members  
 Continuous: 
Number of acres 
Social capital assets        
Cognitive social capital       
Intragroup trust  Three questions concerning 
trust aggregated to provide 
three scores for each group 
 
 Continuous: 
Scores between 1 and 3 
The higher the score, the 
higher the trust 
Group altruism  Group score based on playing 
the Public Goods Game (PGG) 
 
 Continuous: 
Score between 0.46 and 1 
The higher the score, the 
higher the altruistic behavior  
Structural social capital       
Providers/Partners  Service providers and other 
partners that group has worked 




The total number of 
providers divided by number 
of years of group’s existence  
Score between 0.44 and 2 
Membership in other 
groups 




Total number of ties to other 
groups 
Group Wealth Ranking 
Wealth ranking techniques have been widely used in social science research for 
assessing household and individual wealth, especially when it is difficult to obtain 
income and expenditure data (Spring et al. 1996; Brandt and Spring 1998; Grandin 
1988). A number of studies comparing wealth ranking techniques to income, 
expenditure, and other wealth-related data have proven these techniques to be a 
reliable and valid way to measure wealth (Adams et al. 1997; Temu and Due 
2000). This ranking was established by aggregating individual’s wealth ranking to 
the group level. Individual wealth rankings were modeled after those established in 
a joint World Bank and Government of Tanzania study (Narayan 1997) that utilized 
a number of participatory approaches for establishing regional wealth rankings for 
all of Tanzania, which included the regions of Arusha and Kilimanjaro. This provided 
  28 the foundation by which further details were added based on discussions with test-
pilot groups and crosschecked with key informants.  
One particular area of depth that was added was the development of a 
material asset index. The first step was asking the participants to circle all items 
owned by their household from a predefined list. Items were chosen for the 
questionnaire that could be used to improve farm productivity (that is, hand hoe, 
oxen plough, processing machine, and tractor) and marketing (that is, bicycle, cart, 
motorcycle, car, truck, radio, mobile phone, and television). Using Anthropac 
(Borgatti 1992) for the analysis of unidimensionality, a Guttman scale was 
established to assess and assign material wealth (Guest 2000). Eight household 
items (hand hoe, radio, bicycle, cart, oxen plough, mobile phone, television, 
processing machine) produced a high unidimensionality score with a coefficient of 
reproducibility (CR) of 0.95 and coefficient of scalability (CS) of 0.62. These scores 
strongly indicate that all items are a composite measure of one underlying concept 
(Bernard 1995).
18 A material asset index score (1 to 8) was then assigned to each 
group member. The material asset index score along with further considerations, 
which is shown in Table 2, were used to assign each group member a final wealth 
ranking score from 1 to 5. 
                                                      
18The coefficient of reproducibility (CR) is a measure of the unidimensionality of the items in a 
scale. By convention, a CR of 0.90 or higher is accepted as evidence that a set of items have scaled 
unidimensionality (Guest 2000; Bernard 1995). There is, however, one problem with the CR. A high 
CR is “sensitive to extreme marginal distributions in terms of both items and individuals so that a high 
CR can be achieved even in random data” (Guest 2000, 351). In order to deal with extreme 
responses, Menzel (1953) developed the coefficient of scalability (CS), which can be interpreted as a 
proportion reduction in error (PRE) statistic. To the extent that the scale has fewer errors than 
expected by chance, the CS moves toward 1.0. Although there is no definitive score, CS of 0.60 or 
higher is generally considered an acceptable level of error (Guest 2000, 351).  
  29 Table 2. Wealth ranking criteria for group members 
Wealth ranking  Inclusion criteria 
Very Rich  Material asset index: 7–8 
  Over 10 acres of land 
  Usually owns one or more of the following: car, tractor, motorbike 
  May own a store 
  Owns several homes 
  Plants on time 
  Uses commercial fertilizer 
  Owns over 50 head of cattle and goats/sheep 
Rich  Material asset index: 5–6 
  Four to nine acres of land 
  Owns a motorbike 
  May own a small shop 
  Owns a home 
  Plants on time 
  Uses commercial fertilizer 
  Owns over 30 head of cattle and goats/sheep 
Average  Material asset index: 3–4 
  Two to three acres of land 
  Usually owns a home 
  Usually plants on time 
  Usually uses fertilizer, mix of commercial and animal manure 
  Owns around 2 to 3 head of cattle and 3 to 6 goats/sheep 
  Does not usually sell labor 
  May do some small trading in crops/livestock 
Poor  Material asset index: 1–2 
  One acre of land or less 
  May not own a home 
  Does not usually plant on time 
  Does not use commercial fertilizer 
  No cattle and a few goats/sheep 
  Must sell labor some of the time 
Very Poor  Material asset index: 0–1 
  Less than ½ acre of land 
  Does not own a home 
  Does not plant on time 
  Does not use fertilizer 
  Owns little to no livestock 
  Must always sell labor 
Reliable Water Source  
Each group was assigned a score of 0 or 1 based on the group’s access to a reliable 
water source. This was ascertained by individual members’ answers to the self-
administered questionnaire, field observations, and discussions with group 
members and key informants. In most cases, a reliable water source meant that 
majority of group members had access to irrigation for their crops, or where groups 
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elevation and precipitation areas. 
Group Altruism  
Each group member was assessed on whether she or he exuded more self-
interested or more altruistic behavior toward the rest of the group. This individual 
assessment was then aggregated to the group level to get a group altruism score. 
To assess various levels of individual altruistic behavior, each group played a one-
shot Public Goods Game (PGG). The PGG is well known within the field of 
experimental economics and has been applied in several cross-cultural studies 
(Gurven 2004; Henrich 2000). In this adaptation of the PPG, each group member is 
given ten tokens (square pieces of paper) each worth 50 Tanzanian Shillings 
(TShs), thus totaling TShs 500 (or the equivalent of US$0.40). Each member is 
given the option of contributing none, some, or all her/his money to the group 
fund. Any money that is contributed to the group fund will be doubled and then 
shared equally among all members. To clarify the possible outcomes, three 
scenarios are explained to the group: (1) all contribute everything to the group 
fund, and thus double their money with each member getting back TShs 1,000 
(roughly half a day’s wage); (2) no one contributes anything to the group fund, 
thus holding onto their original sum of TShs 500; and finally (3) most members 
contribute everything, and a few members contribute nothing. This final option is 
further explained to the group through an example. If seven players contribute 
everything and three players contribute nothing, the total amount in the group fund 
will be TShs 3,500. Once doubled it becomes TShs 7,000, which divided equally 
leaves each member with TShs 700, except for the three players that contributed 
nothing. Each of these players will end up with their original sum of 500 that they 
did not contribute plus the 700 from the group fund, thus totaling TShs 1200. 
Faced with these scenarios, the PGG game shows how free-riding and self-
interested behavior can be rewarded, but not without negative consequences to the 
rest of the group. Once all the options have been explained, each member makes 
her/his contributions in private to the group fund. The tokens the member chooses 
not to contribute are then turned over on the spot for monetary remuneration. All 
this insures confidentiality with only the final tally of group fund contributions made 
to the group and the final amount in the group fund divided equally. Group altruism 
scores are based on the group’s total contribution to the fund, and ranged from 
0.58 to 1, with lower scores revealing groups with more self-interested members 
and higher scores revealing groups with more altruistic-minded members. 
Intragroup Trust  
Three statements concerning intragroup trust were presented on the questionnaire 
using a three-point Likert scale, with participants responding that they (1) agreed 
with the statement; (2) felt neutral about the statement; or (3) disagreed with the 
statement. They responded to the following three statements: 
•  Most members in your group can be trusted. 
•  Most members in your group are willing to help if you need it. 
•  In your group, members generally do not trust each other in matters of 
lending and borrowing money. 
  31 These answers were then coded from 1 to 3 and aggregated to the group level to 
provide three general measurements of group trust.
19 Trust questions represent 
qualities of cognitive social capital and were adapted from the World Bank’s Social 
Capital Assessment Tools (SOCAT).
20 
Structural Social Capital  
Two variables—“providers/partners” and “membership in other groups”—were 
selected as indicators of structural social capital.
21 The first variable captures the 
aspect of “bridging” social capital, and thus deals with the extent that groups have 
ties or relations with other actors or organizations outside of their community. 
These ties or relations are more vertical in nature and offer opportunities for the 
group to access and obtain new resources. The second variable captures the aspect 
of “bonding” social capital, and thus deals with ties and relationships within their 
community. These ties and relationships are more localized and horizontal in 
nature, and offer opportunities to maximize existing resources. But, the conceptual 
divide between bonding and bridging capital is not always so straightforward, since 
many of these other groups may also have the ability to access new resources and 
thus make it possible that belonging to other groups will serve both the purposes of 
enhancing bonding and bridging social capital. For purposes of this study, the most 
important point to make when considering these social capital variables is to 
distinguish between structural social capital and cognitive social capital. These are 
divided in Table 1 with structural social capital indicators being “providers/partners” 
and “membership in other groups,” and the cognitive social capital indicators being 
the three intragroup trust variables and group altruism. 
                                                      
19The answers to the third trust question concerning matters of money were recoded to fit the 
scale, with lower scores representing low trust and higher scores representing high trust among the 
members. 
20SOCAT can be accessed at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ 
EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,contentMDK:20193049~menuPK:994384~pagePK
:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html.  
21These are recognized indicators of structural social capital in the World Bank’s Social Capital 
Assessment Tools, or SOCAT (see the previous footnote). 
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Explanatory variables  Description    Value 
Education  The average number of years 
of schooling for each group 
 Continuous: 
Number of years of schooling 
Gender        
Group categories  Each group classified into one 
of four gender categories 
based on membership, 
leadership, and 
decisionmaking 
 Nominal:   
1) Female-only groups 
2) Female-dominated groups 
3) Male-dominated groups 
4) Gender-balanced groups 
Leadership by sex  Proportion of male to female 
elected leaders in the group 
 Continuous:   
Score between 0 and 1 
0—All female group 
0.5—Balanced leadership 
1—All male group 
< 0.5—Female majority 
> 0.5—Male majority  
Groups by Gender Categories  
Groups were classified into four basic gender categories. These designations were 
based on group membership, the leadership structure, and the decisionmaking 
dynamics of the leaders.  
•  Female-only groups 
•  Female-dominated groups, whereby the majority of the members are 
women, and the majority of the leaders are women who make the 
important decisions or guide the group.  
•  Gender-balanced groups, where there is a balance of both female and 
male members and male and female leaders who make decisions 
involving the group, but neither sex dominates. 
•  Male-dominated groups, whereby the majority of the members are men 
and majority of leaders are men who make the important decisions and 
guide the group. 
Table 4. Group characteristics variables by description and value 
Explanatory variables  Description    Value 
Group size  Number of active members based on 
data collected during 2nd interview 
 
 Continuous:   
Number of group members 
 
Activity level  The number of internal activities 
that groups are currently doing 
apart from the project intervention 
 
 Continuous: 
Total number of activities per 
group 
 
Maturity  Newly formed group versus groups 
that have been in existence for a 
longer period of time 
 Discrete:   
0 = Groups in existence for 
two years or less 
1 = Groups in existence for 
three years or more 
  33  
Table 5. Group heterogeneity variables by description and value 
Explanatory variables  Description    Value 
Educational  Coefficient of variation, which is 
the standard deviation divided by 
the mean score of the years of 
schooling of members 
 Continuous: 
Score between 0 and 1.13 
The higher the score, the more 
the educational heterogeneity 
Gender  Proportion of male members to 
female members 
 Continuous: 
Score between 0 and 0.76 
The higher the score, the more 
the gender heterogeneity 
Wealth  Coefficient of variation, which is 
the standard deviation divided by 
the mean score of member’s 
wealth ranking 
 Continuous: 
Scores range from 0.13 to 0.46 
The higher the score, the more 
the wealth heterogeneity 
Group Heterogeneity  
The coefficient of variation was used to measure educational and wealth 
heterogeneity. The coefficient of variation is one of the most commonly used 
statistics by organizational researchers for assessing the effects of group-based 
demographic diversity (Bedeian and Mossholder 2000). Gender heterogeneity was 
measured using a proportions statistic. Again, organizational researchers commonly 
use this statistic to assess the effects of heterogeneity on group behavior and 
actions (Williams and Mean 2004). 
Table 6. Market access variables by description and value 
Explanatory variables  Description   Value 
Distance to market  Distance from group meeting location 
to the major regional market 
 Continuous: 
Distance in kilometers 
Road conditions  Road conditions from group meeting 
place to major markets 
 Ordinal   
0 = Bad 
1 = Average 
2 = Good 
Commodity types  The primary crops grown and selected 








Partner agency  The two partner agencies working 
with the farmer groups 
 
 Nominal:   
1) FAIDA 
2) TIP 
Partner agency linkages  Whether or not partner agencies 
actively linked producer groups to 
other chain actors 
 Nominal:   
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
  34 Distance to markets and road conditions  
These two variables represent physical access to markets, and thus consider this 
variable from an exclusively geographical and infrastructural perspective. The 
“distance to markets” variable measures the distance from group meeting place to 
the major market in the region, which for the FAIDA groups is the town of Moshi in 
the Kilimanjaro region, and for the TIP groups it is the town of Arusha in the 
Arumeru Region. The “road condition” variable was built on an ordinal scale with 
the following delineations: 
•  Good road conditions: Group meeting place is 2 kilometers or less from a 
paved road that connects to the major regional market. 
•  Average road conditions: Group meeting place and surrounding area 
connected by gravel road. Road is fairly flat and accessible most of the 
year. 
•  Bad road conditions: Group meeting place and surrounding area 
connected by dirt road only. Road is uneven, difficult to maneuver, and 
may not be passable during the rainy seasons. 
Commodity Types  
Each group has certain crops that their members grow that were put forward as 
possible crops to promote as a viable agroenterprise. It was important to make 
some demarcation between these crops since some have more marketable 
qualities. The crop headings also highlight the different farming systems available 
to the groups. The cereals/legumes category represents traditional staple food 
crops and includes maize, beans, millet, pigeon peas, and sunflower. The other 
categories encompass a number of higher value and nonstaple food crops, and 
include fruits/vegetables, livestock (that is, raising dairy cows and chickens), 
coffee, and rice. 
Partner Agency and Agency Linkages  
The “partner agency” variable is categorized under market access because the PAs 
are attempting to enhance the marketing skills of the farmer groups in the hope 
that groups will undertake collective action initiatives to improve their market 
situations. Given some of the differences in the training activities, there is the 
expectation that each PA will have varying results in improving the marketing 
performance of their respective farmer groups. Likewise, PAs are also active in 
linking farmer groups to other chain market actors, and thus both their market 
linkage success and failures will impact groups’ marketing performance. 
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Full List of Study Variables by Group Marketing Performance 
Table 1. Infrastructure variables by group marketing performance 




Explanatory variables    0  1  2      No Yes  %  Improved 
Distance to market    31.73  22.54 27.33     31.73 24.05   
Road  conditions                
Bad    6 2 3      6 5  45 
Average    6 5 3      6 8  57 
Good    3 6 0      3 6  67 
Reliable  water  source                
Yes   3  9  6      3  15  84 
No    12 4 0      12 4  25 
Commodity  types                
Cereals/legumes    10 4 0      10 4  29 
Coffee    2 0 1      2 1  33 
Livestock    3 1 1      3 2  40 
Rice    0 1 1      0 2  100 
Vegetables/fruit   0  7  3      0  10  100 
Land   3.55  3.04 3.53     3.55 3.26   
Table 2. Social structure variables (group assets) by group marketing 
performance 
  Marketing performance rating  Market improvement 
Explanatory  variables    0 1 2      No Yes 
Wealth ranking     3.13  3.17  3.45  3.13  3.26 
Education (years in school)    6.6  7.1  7.6  6.6  7.2 
General trust    2.56  2.60  2.45  2.56  2.55 
Help trust    2.59  2.69  2.52  2.59  2.63 
Money trust    2.28  2.28  2.34  2.28  2.30 
Altruism   0.86  0.87  0.85  0.86  0.86 
Providers/partners   0.63  0.95  0.76  0.76  0.85 
Membership in other groups    4.14  3.33  5.17  4.14  3.94 
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marketing performance 
  Marketing performance rating  Market improvement 
Explanatory  variables    0 1 2      No Yes  %  Improved 
Maturity                
Newly formed groups    8  6  0      8  6  43 
Existing  groups   7  7  6     7  13  65 
Size of groups    31.40  29.77  35.40      31.40  31.33   
Activity  level   0.53  1.46  2.17     0.53  1.68   
Gender categories                    
Female-dominated   2  0  1     2  1  33 
Female-only   1  2  0     1  2  67 
Male-dominated   2  4  2     2  6  75 
Gender  balanced   10  7  3     10  10  50 
Leadership by sex    0.49  0.60  0.71      0.49  0.64   
Table 4. Social structure variables (group heterogeneity) by group 
marketing performance 
Explanatory variables  Marketing performance rating  Market improvement 
   0  1  2      No  Yes   
Educational heterogeneity    0.35  0.32  0.27    0.35 0.30   
Gender heterogeneity    0.47  0.49  0.58    0.47 0.52   
Wealth heterogeneity    0.23  0.25  0.25    0.23 0.25   
Table 5. Partner agency intervention variables by group marketing 
performance 




Partner details   0 1 2      No Yes  %  Improved 
Partner  agency              
 FAIDA     9  6  1  9  7  44 
 TIP    6  7  5  6  12  67 
Agency  linkage            
 Linked    3  7  3  3  10  77 
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